Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period

Edited by

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Contents

Acknowledgements  IX
Notes on the Editors  X
Notes on the Contributors  XII
List of Illustrations  XVII

1 Introduction: Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period  1
  Karl A.E. Enenkel and Anita Traninger

2 Feeling Rage: The Transformation of the Concept of Anger in Eighteenth Century Germany  16
  Johannes F. Lehmann

PART 1
Anger Management in Early Modern Philosophical Discourses

3 Neo-Stoicism as an Antidote to Public Violence before Lipsius's De constantia: Johann Weyer's (Wier's) Anger Therapy, De ira morbo (1577)  49
  Karl A.E. Enenkel

4 Anger Management and the Rhetoric of Authenticity in Montaigne's De la colère (11, 31)  97
  Anita Traninger

5 Neostoic Anger: Lipsius's Reading and Use of Seneca's Tragedies and De ira  126
  Jan Papy

6 Descartes' Notion of Anger: Aspects of a Possible History of its Premises  143
  Michael Krewet

7 Holy Desperation and Sanctified Wrath: Anger in Puritan Thought  172
  David M. Barbee
PART 2

Learned Debates about Anger

8 Anger and its Limits in the Ethical Philosophy of Giovanni Pontano 197
  John Nassichuk

9 Northern Anger: Early Modern Debates on Berserkers 217
  Bernd Roling

10 Anger and the Unity of Philosophy: Interlocking Discourses of Natural and Moral Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment 238
  Tamás Demeter

PART 3

Anger in Literary Discourses: Epic and Drama

11 Iustas in iras? Perspectives on Anger as a Driving Force in Neo-Latin Epic 261
  Christian Peters

12 Epic Anger in La Gerusalemme liberata: Rinaldo’s Irascibility and Tasso’s Allegoria della Gerusalemme 288
  Betül Dilmac

13 ‘In Zoren zu wütiger Rach’: Angry Women and Men in the German Drama of the Reformation Period 312
  Barbara Sasse Tateo

14 Pierre Corneilles’s Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste in Light of Contemporary Discourses on Anger (Descartes, Le Moyne, Senault) 331
  Jakob Willis
PART 4
Visual Representations of Anger

15 Visual Representations of Medea’s Anger in the Early Modern Period: Rembrandt and Rubens 357
   Maria Berbara

PART 5
Anger in Political Discourses

16 Negotiating with ‘Spirits of Brimstone and Salpetre’: Seventeenth Century French Political Officials and Their Practices and Representations of Anger 381
   Tilman Haug

17 Narratives of Reconciliation in Early Modern England: Between Oblivion, Clemency and Forgiveness 403
   Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen

PART 6
Transcultural Notions of Anger

18 Royal Wrath: Curbing the Anger of the Sultan 439
   N. Zeynep Yelçe

19 Anger and Rage in Traditional Chinese Culture 458
   Paolo Santangelo

Index nominum 487
Chapter 2

Feeling Rage: The Transformation of the Concept of Anger in Eighteenth Century Germany

Johannes F. Lehmann

During the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany, the concepts of the emotions of anger and rage (Zorn and Wut) are subjected to an epochal discursive transformation. The crucial event is the replacement of anger as an emotion (Affekt) by rage as a feeling (Gefühl). The present paper will be explaining this process of transformation.1

In his Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle defines anger (Zorn, in German translations) based on a formula of “slight—pain—revenge” which has remained valid for centuries: ‘Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved.’2 Anger is a social event; this is a fact essential to the entire discourse of anger in classical antiquity, and, accordingly, the term ‘slight’ (ολιγωριο) is pivotal to Aristotle’s description.3 His focus on the principle that connects pain to disregard and, finally, to a lusty desire for revenge, suggests a twofold social determination. Firstly, the slight one has suffered causes a pain which will then provoke anger, as it is considered either to be ‘undeserved’ or has been emitted by a subject who in one’s own opinion does not have the merit to do so.4 In this case, anger signifies the impulse to seek revenge for an inappropriate social slight. Secondly, and this is the other aspect of social determination, anger is always born out of one’s own hypostatized superiority. I believe the decisive sentence in Aristotle’s theory on

1 My paper gives an abbreviated and condensed version of chapters IV and V from my book: Lehmann J.F., Im Abgrund der Wut. Zur Kultur- und Literaturgeschichte der Wut (Freiburg i. Br.: 2012) 131–190. In the present paper, “anger” will be used whenever it indicates “Zorn”, while “rage” will be standing for “Wut” in the German sense. For the translation I have to thank Silke Mestern.
3 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 175, mentions three forms of disregard: ‘dissain, spitefulness, and insult.’
anger is the observation that a person displays anger because of ‘her superior rank’.  

The principle of “slight—pain—revenge” is repeated by other antique authors, albeit in different variations, either explicitly (in theoretical writings) or implicitly (in the narrated examples), as in Cicero and Plutarch, or as in Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy. Zeno is reported to have said: ‘anger [is] a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury.’ Seneca claims nearness to Aristotle, and even though his Stoic view on anger differs considerably from the Aristotelian viewpoint, both authors do coincide in that they emphasise the link of honour and revenge as the main element in the basic narrative of anger. In the Middle Ages, anger continues to be the emotion (Affekt) of revenge. Leaning strongly on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas explains in his Summa theologica how ‘an angry reaction arises only when one has endured some pain, and desires and hopes for revenge.’ Authors from the early modern period up to the eighteenth century,


9 The differences mainly concern the appraisal of the committed insult of honour. The Stoics take the insult as an internal challenge, denying it could be a legitimate trigger for anger, as only lowly beings allow themselves to feel anger if their honour is slighted. Thereby, the interconnection of slight of honour and an irate desire for revenge is confirmed even in the attempt of dissolving it.

‘Anger is a covetous inclination of the heart to take prompt revenge for defamation encountered.’

It is at the end of the eighteenth century, when authors like the jurist Christian Westphal first find the old definition of anger insufficient and broaden it significantly: ‘We hate that which causes us unpleasant and ill-willed feelings for being contrary to our wish and desire. If it erupts suddenly, then there is anger. \textit{There does not need to be any prior insult,} no action of another that defies duty.’ With this statement, Westphal draws attention to the significant limitation of the antique definition of anger as he expressly includes motives for anger that do not arise either from an insult of the sphere of honour, or from the violation of any given norm: he speaks of anger beyond slight and injustice. Whereas the jurist Westphal points out the necessity of amplifying the definition of anger, the psychologist Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maaß from Halle analyses the emotion (\textit{Affect}) of anger with regard to the \textit{perception of annoyance (Verdrüß)}, out of which may arise not only anger but also vexation (\textit{Ärger}). However, annoyance and vexation are not reactions to an insult, but relate instead—energetically—to the ‘agitation that takes hold of the mind through the vague activities of its powers.’\footnote{\textit{‘Der Zorn ist eine begierige Herzneigung / sich alsofort zu rächen wegen einer zugefügten Beleidigung.’} Schottel, \textit{Ethica} 232.}\footnote{\textit{‘Das hassen wir, wogegen bey uns unangenehme und übelwollende Empfindungen entstehen, weil es unserem Wunsch und Verlangen zuwider. Geschieht es mit Aufbrausen ist der Zorn da. \textit{Hier braucht keine Beleidigung}, keine pflichtwidrige Handlung eines anderen vorhanden zu seyn.’} Westphal, \textit{Grundsätze} 8 (emphasis in original).}\footnote{\textit{‘Unruhe, worin die unbestimmte Regsamkeit der Kräfte das Gemüth versetzt.’} Maaß J.G.E., \textit{Versuch über Gefühle, besonders über die Affecten} (Halle – Leipzig: 1811/1812) 349. In a similar approach, Ernst Platner introduces annoyance (\textit{Verdruss}) as a new primary category in the human emotional set-up: ‘Those particular agitated human perceptions may all be summed up under the general term: annoyance.’ (‘Die bestimmten unruhigen, menschlichen Empfindungen können allesammt befaßt werden unter dem allgemeinen Namen: Verdrüß.’)\footnote{\textit{‘[…] alle Kräfte auf, diesem Uebel und seinem Urheber zu widerstreben.’} Platner, \textit{Neue Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise} vol. 1 (Leipzig, Crusius: 1790) § 1050.} Platner, \textit{Neue Anthropologie} 348f.\footnote{\textit{Platner, \textit{Neue Anthropologie} 350: ‘This constrained or moderated annoyance is vexation, whereas the unrestrained or effervescent is anger.’ (‘Dieser gehaltene, oder gedämpfte Verdrüß ist der Ärger, und der ungehaltene oder aufbrausende dagegen der Zorn.’)\textit{}}} Avoidable evils, of which one finds a person guilty, produce annoyance and excite ‘all powers to go against this evil and its creator.’\footnote{\textit{‘[…] alle Kräfte auf, diesem Uebel und seinem Urheber zu widerstreben.’} Platner, \textit{Neue Anthropologie} 348f.} When this happens in an effervescence of emotion, it elicits anger; should it occur, instead, with constraint and moderation, the emotion produced is that of vexation.\footnote{Platner, \textit{Neue Anthropologie} 350: ‘This constrained or moderated annoyance is vexation, whereas the unrestrained or effervescent is anger.’ (‘Dieser gehaltene, oder gedämpfte Verdrüß ist der Ärger, und der ungehaltene oder aufbrausende dagegen der Zorn.’)} In a similar fashion, in his definition of anger in paragraph 987 of his \textit{Philosophische Aphorismen}, Ernst Platner accentuates the
element of experiencing annoyance: ‘Anger is a vivid sense of annoyance about persons who involve us in unpleasant events, e.g. loss, insult, obstacle, etc.’\(^{19}\) While in this instance Platner still does mention insults received from other people as a cause for annoyance, he is quick to correct himself by expanding on the issue in the paragraph following the next: ‘Even though anger is always directed toward people, it is not always, at first, provoked by the annoyance at people who cause the unpleasant event; rather, it is often directed at random, to have an object on which to express itself.’\(^{20}\) Insult has ceased to be the paradigm; it has been replaced by obstruction, as anger now seems to arise from a specific disposition of the inner world that stands in no direct causal relationship with the events occurring in the environment. Instead, there can be an inner irritability, a—possibly unconscious—‘reluctant dissatisfaction’, which ‘was (already) present when the unpleasant event arose but was intensified by it, only then to be transferred onto it.’\(^{21}\) This consideration of energetic transfers and abreactions points to the concept of the individuality of the psyche.

While the causes for anger are thus extended beyond the genuine events of insult and slighting, one can find earlier as well as parallel instances where the intentionality of anger has already been transformed, i.e. where, in the course of the eighteenth century, revenge has been eliminated from definitions of anger.\(^{22}\) A prominent example of this new view is Immanuel Kant's definition of anger, which does not mention insult and revenge at all, but instead talks of evils (Übel), powers (Kräfte) and resistance (Widerstand). ‘Anger’, so he says in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, ‘is fright that at the same time quickly stirs up powers to resist ill.’\(^{23}\) Johann Christian Hoffbauer writes:


\(^{20}\) ‘Obwohl der Zorn allzeit auf Personen gerichtet ist, so ist doch die erste Ursache, die ihn erregt, nicht allzeit Verdruss über die Personen, welche die unangenehme Begebenheit verursachen, sondern oft nimmt er diese Richtung nur zufälliger Weise, um einen Gegenstand zu haben, an dem er sich äußere.’ Platner, *Philosophische Aphorismen* 397.


\(^{22}\) In the doctrine of the four kinds of anger (*Lehre vom vierfachen Zorn*) which Platner sets out to develop in a space of ten pages in his *Philosophische Aphorismen*, revenge is not mentioned once.

‘For motivations for anger exist already for the child, as soon as it experiences a resistance that tempts it to gather its powers and rise against it.’24 And Johann Christian Lossius, professor of theology in Erfurt since 1772, regards anger as the attempt not to be taking revenge for any insult or evil deed, but rather ‘to eliminate it’ (‘dasselbe zu entfernen’).25 And finally, Albert Mathias Vering writes in his 1817 Psychische Heilkunde: ‘The feeling born out of the loathing of an object, and accompanied by a fierce action aiming to eliminate it, is called anger; a state of mind counted among the emotions [Affecten].’26

Zedler’s definition of anger already stands out as it substitutes revenge, but not the insult, by mere reluctance: ‘Anger is the emotion that arises from the idea of any suffered insult, be it to oneself or to another person whom one regards highly, and that drives one to fend off the evil that threatens to spring from it.’27 As revenge ceases to be an issue, Zedler proceeds to also exclude, by
definition, the pain which had initially been stated as the cause for seeking revenge. What remains is anger as an ‘eagerness to remove the evil’. The question of whether anger is desire for revenge (and therefore evil) or an ‘emotion that perceives evil and in response to this perception moves man to rid himself of it’ (thereby being indifferent), is discussed by Thomasius as early as at the close of the seventeenth century. Albeit with a defensive attitude, he once more repeats the definition of anger based on a desire for revenge: ‘But everybody admits that anger, should it be a desire for revenge, is indeed true anger.’

Thomasius explicitly names two possible concepts of anger that exclude one another: ‘One calls for revenge to establish good and has already overcome the insult or the evil; the other, however, merely seeks to get rid of the evil while he is experiencing it, without any desire for revenge.’ Thomasius rejects this second concept of anger without revenge, but cannot prevent it from becoming more and more accepted. A similar interpretation can be found in John Locke, who points out expressly how anger is an emotion not to be found in all men, as it presupposes ‘some mixed Considerations of our selves and others’ that are sometimes lacking, namely ‘valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge.’ To Locke, anger indisputably counts among the privileges of the honourable man: without a desire for revenge there can be no anger. In his writings, Gottsched—like Adelung and, later, Campe—does acknowledge

30 ‘Nun geben aber alle zu / daß der Zorn / so ferne er eine Rachbegierde ist / ein eigentlicher Zorn sey.’ Thomasius, Ausübung der Sittenlehre 424.
31 ‘Jener verlanget nach Rache als was guten / und hat die Beleidigung oder das Böse schon überstanden; Dieser aber will nur das gegenwärtige Böse von Halse loß werden / ohne Verlangen nach Rache.’ Thomasius, Ausübung der Sittenlehre 423.
32 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 231f.
33 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 231f.
34 Gottsched Johann Christoph, “Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit (Praktischer Teil)”, in Ausgewählte Werke, ed. P.M. Mitchell, vol. v, 2 (Berlin – New York: 1983) 342: ‘Finally, anger results from the idea of injustice that somebody has brought upon us. Should one want to lessen it, one has to demonstrate to the irate person that he whom he considers his insulter has not committed the evil.’ (‘Endlich entsteht der Zorn, aus der Vorstellung des Unrechts, das uns jemand angethan hat. Will man denselben dämpfen, so muß man dem Zürnenden zeigen, daß derjenige, den er für seinen Beleidiger hält, das Böse nicht gethan habe.’)
insult or injustice, but nowhere is there any mention of revenge as the essence of anger; the closest he admits to is ‘repulsion’ (‘Unwillen’).35 Since the Age of Enlightenment, revenge has thus been separated from anger as an emotion, and/or reformulated as a resistance against evil or, generally, against any opposition to one’s own wishes.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, under the aegis of feeling as a new category, the emotion of anger is placed in a field of energetic terms: activity, energy, and power (Kraft) on one side, obstruction and resistance on the other. And to all of them applies that ‘each power will increase its activity in relation to the resistance encountered in its exertion.’36 Jurists like Ernst Carl Wieland go as far as to redefine the category of insult—which is elemental for anger and the right to revenge—in energetic terms of feeling. From Aristotle to Schottelius, insult and slight had been deduced from social hierarchies and the notions of honour originating in them. Wieland, however, considers the insult to be aimed at the ‘humiliating conscience of the superiority of external forces’.37 In a similar way, i.e. in the sense of a distinctly felt decline of powers, physiologist Karl Friedrich Burdach formulates in his Handbuch der Pathologie: ‘anger is a vivid feeling of incompletion, and all efforts to remedy this are directed against the causer of this imperfection.’38 Even if there is an evidently guilty person, anger can be said to be generated entirely from within, as a sense of “imperfection”, which Burdach describes as a ‘limitation of ourselves or as a constraint of another power, to which we feel related’.39 In consequence, the wish for revenge and retaliation can be explained by the consciousness of a competition of powers and the self-affection by one’s own sense of power.

35 Joachim H. Campe writes that anger is ‘the passion that leads one to openly and unrestrainedly express strong repulsion regarding an insult one has suffered.’ (‘Diejenige Leidenschaft, da man seinen Unwillen über eine erlittene Beleidigung ohne allen Rückhalt heftig äußert.’) Campe J.H., Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, vol. 5 (Braunschweig: 1811) 879.
38 ‘Zorn ist das lebhafte Gefühl einer Unvollkommenheit, wobey die dagegen reagierende Bestrebung gegen den Urheber dieser Unvollkommenheit gerichtet ist.’ Burdach K.F., Handbuch der Pathologie (Leipzig: 1808) 165.
According to this, revenge makes sense simply because ‘it is only after the humiliation of the enemy that the idea of the superiority of his powers can be dissipated as well in their own minds as in those of other people, and make room for the much more pleasant notion of their own activities and range of influence.’\textsuperscript{40} Retaliation is intended to reestablish one’s own sense of power and superiority by causing the other to experience the very feeling of inferiority one has been made to suffer.

As we can see, the end of the eighteenth century brings with it two noticeable developments: Firstly, the old anger being completed by new emotions and feelings that go beyond slight—pain—revenge. This leads either to a critical review of the definition of anger or/and to the expansion of the narrative by vexation (Ärger) and annoyance (Verdruss) against the background of a paradigm of power and resistance. Secondly, it becomes evident how the components of the old definition of anger—revenge and insult, insofar as they are still mentioned at all (and they are)—are themselves either adapted to the paradigm or concealed by it.

If one takes into further account that the early European narrative discusses anger as the emotion of the kings (Herrscherraßt) and ties the lust for revenge to the availability of resources of power (Macht) and violence to follow through with it, then one can say that at the end of the eighteenth century, anger is democratized at the level of its description and of its theory. If the principle of slight and revenge is replaced or expanded by a model of obstruction and resistance, everybody is entitled to feel anger or rage—indpendently of the actual distribution of power.

\textbf{1 Emotion (Affekt) and Representation (Vorstellung) around 1700}

This completely new description of rage and anger dating from the end of the eighteenth century no longer follows the old emotional model (Affektmodell) which regards emotion as an obscure idea and therefore as a manifestation of the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), defining anger as the desire to seek revenge. Instead, it approaches emotion as a feeling. The transition of the discourse about emotions from emotion (Affekt) to one about feeling (Gefühl) is essential as historic background of the discourse that leads to the new definition of anger at the end of the eighteenth century.

\textsuperscript{40} ‘[…] weil sich erst nach der Demüthigung ihres Feindes die Idee von der Ueberlegenheit seiner Kräfte sowohl bei ihnen selbst als bei andern Menschen verlieren, und der weit angenehmern Vorstellung von ihrer Thätigkeit und von dem weiten Umfange ihres Wirkungskreises Platz machen konnte.’ Wieland, Wiedervergeltung 109.
According to the philosophical tradition of the seventeenth century, as represented by Leibniz, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Thomasius, or Wolff, emotions are representations, resp. ideas. However, they are only such ideas that act immediately on the will, i.e. eliciting sensual desires, and these are mainly the so-called obscure, the unclear resp. the confused ideas. All of the inner life (Seelenleben)—as well as the emotions—can be ascribed to representations,\textsuperscript{41} and is attributed to the will or sensual desire (appetitus sensitivus) that is commanded by the respective representation.\textsuperscript{42} Consequently, emotions start out as being specific manifestations of thoughts or ideas. Even Garve still writes, in 1767, how we must describe emotions as a particular sort of ideas, since ‘the only power of the soul that we know of is to produce ideas’.\textsuperscript{43} Accordingly, John Locke defines hatred ‘as the thought of the pain’\textsuperscript{44} that determines a kind of quest. The representations are the ones to define the will and they produce the affective twofold motion of desiring and loathing, of loving and hating.\textsuperscript{45}

‘It is evident’, says Hobbes in his Leviathan in the paragraph on ‘the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS’,\textsuperscript{46} ‘that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.’\textsuperscript{47} This

\textsuperscript{41} In view of the privileged regard for the representing power (vorstellende Kraft) that is characteristic of Leibniz’s and Wolff’s philosophy, Max Dessoir speaks of an ‘energetic theory of consciousness’ (energetische Theorie des Bewußtseins). Dessoir M., Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie (Berlin: 1902; reprint Amsterdam: 1964) 377.

\textsuperscript{42} In opposition to the appetitus sensibilis (sensual desire), Wolff mentions the appetitus rationale (force of will). Wolff Christian, Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, anderer Theil. Anmerkungen zur deutschen Metaphysik (Hildesheim u.a.: 1983) 227. Thomas Aquinas writes about the appetitus sensibilis as the defining element of the emotions. So does Hobbes, who describes emotions as desires and aversions (appetitus et fuga constant’; Christian Wolff, too, includes the appetitus sensitivus in his definition of emotion. All references in Art. "Affekt", in Eisler R., Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (Berlin: 1904).

\textsuperscript{43} ‘[Da] die Kraft Ideen hervorzubringen die einzige der Seele ist, die wir kennen […]’: So much for Christian Garve, as cited in Campe R., Affekt und Ausdruck. Zur Umwandlung der literarischen Rede im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: 1990) 384. This is why Descartes already tries to differentiate ‘passions of the soul […]’ from all its other thoughts’. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul art. 27, 33.

\textsuperscript{44} Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 230 (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{47} Hobbes, Leviathan 39.
especially applies to the obscure representations. ‘Out of an unclear idea of
good, sensual desire is born.’\textsuperscript{48} Descartes, too, defines emotions as ‘cogitationes
confusa’.\textsuperscript{49} It is the representation of an object we have identified as good that
incites our will to strive for this very object. Wolff writes correspondingly: ‘since
all good leads to perfection of ourselves as well as of our condition (§ 422), and
since the intuition of perfection causes pleasure (§ 404), so the intuitive cogni-
tion of the good must cause pleasure, as soon as we recognize it to be good.’\textsuperscript{50} In
the case of the obscure representations, the notion whether objects are good or
evil is acquired through the respective feeling of pleasure or displeasure/pain.
Accordingly, Leibniz writes (in compliance with Locke): ‘From pleasure and
pain come the passions.’\textsuperscript{51} For out of the intuition of the good, however unclear
it may be, and the pleasure resulting from it, rises in turn sensual desire, which
to Wolff is the \textit{definiens} of emotion: \textsuperscript{52} ‘Out of the unclear representation of
the good arises sensual desire, which is therefore nothing but an inclination
of the soul toward the matter we obscurely identify as good.’\textsuperscript{53} Thereby, on the
one hand, emotions are related to the present sensations of pleasure and pain,
while on the other hand they refer to the future of that which the will, moved
by the obscure representation, is striving to achieve. Insofar as pleasure and
pain are ultimately conceived of as representations (however obscure) and not
as feelings, they are always related, originally, to either will or desire. Hobbes

\textsuperscript{48} ‘Aus der undeutlichen Vorstellung des Guten entsteht die sinnliche Begierde.’ Wolff,\textit{ Vernünftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen} ch. 3, § 434, 266.

\textsuperscript{49} As cited in Bernecker K., \textit{Kritische Darstellung der Geschichte des Affektbegriifes. (Von Descartes bis zur Gegenwart)} (Berlin: 1915) 20. Definitions of emotion (Affekt) as ‘confusa
idea’ (Spinoza) or ‘pensées confuses’ (Leibniz) are quite common. They all have their ori-

\textsuperscript{50} ‘Weil das Gute uns und unseren Zustand vollkommen machet (§ 422), das Anschauen
der Vollkommenheit aber Lust erreget (§ 404), so muss die anschauende Erkäntniß des
Guten Lust erregen, wenn wir es nämlich als gut einsehen.’ Wolff, \textit{Vernünftige Gedancken},
ch. 3, § 423, 261.

J. Benett (Cambridge: 1997) 163 (11, XX, §3). ‘Aus der Lust und dem Schmerz rühren die
Leidenschaften her.’ Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm, \textit{Neue Abhandlungen über den mensch-
lichen Verstand I. Philosophische Schriften}, vol. 3.1. French and German, ed. and trans.

\textsuperscript{52} Wolff, \textit{Vernünftige Gedancken} § 439, 269: ‘A noticeable degree of sensual desire or sensual
aversion is called emotion’ (‘Ein mercklicher Grad der sinnlichen Begierde und des sinn-
llichen Abscheues wird ein Affect genennet’).

\textsuperscript{53} ‘Aus der undeutlichen Vorstellung des Guten entstehet die sinnliche Begierde, welche
demnach nichts anderes ist als eine Neigung der Seele gegen die Sache, davon wir einen
speaks of the passions as ‘the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions’.\textsuperscript{54} This is why Christian Thomasius calls the emotions \textit{dispositions} of the mind (\textit{Gemüthsneigungen}, temper) and defines them as follows:

The dispositions of the mind are movements \textsuperscript{g} of the human will \textsuperscript{h} toward pleasant or adverse things \textsuperscript{i} which are nonexistent or lie in the future \textsuperscript{l} and that arise from the powerful impressions \textsuperscript{m} of exterior things \textsuperscript{n} on the heart of man \textsuperscript{o} and from the consequent extraordinary movement of the bloods \textsuperscript{q}.\textsuperscript{55}

The fact that emotions should be defined as motions of the will triggered by representations (this is still the case in Gottsched),\textsuperscript{56} leads to consequences in the definition of anger. Thomasius, who follows the Aristotelian tradition, defines anger as the pain caused by an insult and the resulting wish for revenge.\textsuperscript{57} The element of the presently felt pain (the feeling) thus recedes on behalf of the element of the will as the \textit{definiens} of the emotion: anger ‘calls for revenge as something good and has already overcome the insult or evil.’\textsuperscript{58}

However, the aspect of the presently \textit{felt} pain or \textit{sense} of annoyance which arises beyond any \textit{desire} for revenge turns into the full definition of anger as soon as the emotions cease to be regarded as movements and representations of movements,\textsuperscript{59} but are regarded as feelings (\textit{Gefühle}) instead. The problem inherent to the discussion of emotions during the seventeenth and even the eighteenth century is that pain and pleasure are linked to the present, while the emotion as movement and desire is regarded in relation to something either not present or lying in the future. Thomasius’s defense of the classic view which equates the emotion of anger with the desire for revenge is entirely

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54 & Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan} 39. \\
55 & ‘Die Gemüthsneigungen sind Bewegungen \textsuperscript{g} des menschlichen Willens \textsuperscript{h} zu angenehmen oder wiedrigen Dingen / \textsuperscript{i} die abwesend oder zukünftig sind / \textsuperscript{l} welche von denen starcken Eindrückungen \textsuperscript{m} äußerlicher Dinge \textsuperscript{n} in das Hertze des Menschen / \textsuperscript{o} und der daraus erfolgten ausserordentlichen \textsuperscript{p} Bewegung des Geblüts \textsuperscript{q} entstehen.’ Thomasius, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} 105. \\
56 & Gottsched, “Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit” 335. \\
57 & Thomasius, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} 423. \\
58 & Ibidem 425. ’[Der Zorn] verlangt nach Rache als was guten / und hat die Beleidigung oder das Böse schon überstanden’. \\
59 & See Dessoir, \textit{Geschichte} 78. An exemplary exposition on this can be found in Meier Georg Friedrich, \textit{Theoretische Lehre der Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt} (Halle, Hemmerde: 1744) \S\ 47–49. \\
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due to this definition of emotion as will.\textsuperscript{60} For this implies that the emotion is exclusively seen in relation to future or absent matters, i.e. as movement toward something. By contrast, according to Thomasius, the dimension of the present, the sensation of pleasure or displeasure, does not belong to emotion and will, but to the understanding, where these sensations are registered.\textsuperscript{61} This is why Thomasius cannot define anger as a feeling of incompletion, as is done at the end of the eighteenth century, i.e. in relation to the dimension of the present self-perception (Selbstempfinden), but only in relation to the inherent volition of something in the future: revenge. It is precisely this dimension of the present, which Thomasius reassigns from the emotional sphere to the sphere of understanding, that at the end of the eighteenth century is incorporated into emotion as ‘feeling’ (Gefühl), with immediate consequences for the description of anger. As an example, the ‘fright’ (Schreck) which Kant considers to be essential to anger is not an emotion at all in the eyes of Thomasius, as it lies in the present and has no relation to a will directed at the future.\textsuperscript{62}

2 Rage as a Feeling (around 1800)

The changes made to the theory of emotion during the eighteenth century focus mainly on transcending the seventeenth century’s analysis of emotion as a correspondence of representation and affective motion\textsuperscript{63} and on elaborating instead on the distinction of feeling, emotion and passion i.e. focusing on the experience of the emotion. The old emotional entities taken from classical rhetoric are now dissolved and replaced by an ‘infinity of differences in

\textsuperscript{60} Thomasius, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} 73–78. In opposition to Descartes’s concept of passion, Thomasius emphasises the aspect of activity inherent to emotion by positioning the emotion (Affekt) within the scope of the will.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibidem 88f. This relocation is also applied to the body. While the present sensation (Empfindung) of pleasure resp. displeasure occurs in the understanding and brain of man (‘im Verstände und Gehirne des Menschen’), ‘the tempers reside in the will and heart’ (‘Gemüthsneigungen [sitzen] in dem Willen und Herzen’). Ibidem 89.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibidem 101. To Thomasius ‘the strong impressions on the brain / or the movement of the spirits in the nerves’ (‘Die starcke Eindrückung ins Gehirn / oder die Bewegung der Geister in Nerven’) are neither equivalent to the emotion nor are they its cause.

\textsuperscript{63} Descartes’s analysis of emotions describes these as concatenation of motions, proposing that the representations (Vorstellungen) may be regarded as (physiological) motions and the physiological motions as representations. For more details see Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} 341–344.
feelings'. Psychology as an empirical science is developed by covering the space of ‘feeling’ between will and representation which the discourse has opened up by the end of the eighteenth century. The emotion ceases to be regarded solely in reference to the sphere of representations, i.e. as an obscure representation, as will resp. desire. Rather, emotion is now regarded as the increase and climax of a feeling. Ever since, we regard emotions as feelings, so that—in accordance with Tetens and Kant—we are ‘used to discuss them along with the feelings’. What, then, is feeling?

Feelings are not representations, nor consciousness, nor sensations, nor excitement/stimulus of the body, nor ideas arising from this, nor feelings stimulated merely by the body; they are not touch or intuition: instead, they are a distinct category of predispositions [Inlagen] that exist in the soul together with knowledge and consciousness, and whose main kind are pleasures and displeasures.

Feeling, in terms of a ‘distinct category of predispositions’, is developed as a sort of continuously processing psychological instrument for self-perception.
and feedback. As described by Tetens, the feeling informs ‘of the correlation between the object that is felt, and the present composition of the soul with its capacities and powers’.68 Central to this feedback is the respective current composition, the momentum of change: A feeling is ‘not a permanent disposition, but a transformation of my temper’,69 and ‘the condition of our temper is constantly changed’.70

What essentially drives the discourse to distinguish feeling on the one hand from imagination and the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen) on the other, is, as indicated above, the temporal dimension, i.e. the permanent presentness. ‘Only changes in the now and here, only our present conditions can be objects of feeling. An object of representation can be a thing in the past or the future.’71 And other than the faculty of desire, feeling cannot reach past the present moment. It does not consist in ‘any effort or preparation to make a change. It does not go beyond the present.’72 Finally, in contrast to the old


71 ‘Nur jetzige Veränderungen, gegenwärtige Zustände von uns, können Objekte des Gefühls seyn. Die Vorstellungen haben auch das Vergangene und Zukünftige zum Gegenstand.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 170. The paragraph is entitled: ‘1) Feeling has to do only with things in the present’ (‘Das Gefühl hat nur mit gegenwärtigen Dingen zu thun’).

72 ‘[Es besteht] in keinem Bestreben, in keinem Ansatz, eine neue Veränderung zu bewirken. Es gehet nicht über das Gegenwärtige hinaus.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 171. Even where feeling is thought of as the basis for any effort of the mind to uphold or to abandon the current condition, it is still differentiated from the effort itself. See, for instance, Schmid, Empirische Psychologie 262f. By differentiating, within the concept of feeling, the aspect of pleasure/displeasure on one hand and the aspect of desire on the other, it becomes possible to think of a disinterested delight (Wohlgefallen)—or a delight ‘without further interest’ (‘ohne weiteres Interesse’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 188) that elicits an agreeable feeling insofar as it allows to perceive the usefulness of one’s own faculties and powers. For this argument, cf. Stöckmann E., Anthropologische Ästhetik.
perception of emotion linked to the faculty of desire (which describes a figure of movement, a passing *perturbatio animi*) a feeling never ceases to be active.\textsuperscript{73} It does not denote an event or disturbance, but a necessary and innate ‘passive modification of the soul’.\textsuperscript{74} Thus feeling becomes fundamental, and it does so to the extent ‘that a life without feeling appeared to be as impossible as a consciousness without a sense of self’.\textsuperscript{75}

‘Thus originates the threefold division into feeling (i.e. the faculty to modify them and consciousness of them!), understanding and will.’\textsuperscript{76} To this day, this division into the ‘three main faculties’,\textsuperscript{77} resp. the ‘three principal forms of life of the psyche’,\textsuperscript{78} remains fundamental for textbooks on emotional psychology.\textsuperscript{79} What we call, today, the emotional or the mental (*das Psychische*) first originates here. In turn, Kant determines the modern use of language for the word

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\textsuperscript{Philosophie, Psychologie und ästhetische Theorie der Emotionen im Diskurs der Aufklärung (Tübingen: 2009) 183–199.}

\textsuperscript{Beneke F.E., *Psychologische Skizzen*. Vol. 1: Zur Naturlehre der Gefühle (Göttingen: 1825) 35. defines feeling as the ‘measurings of the soul’s activities against one another that occur *in every moment of life*’ (emphasis in original) (*[das] in jedem Lebensaugenblicke Statt findende Sich-gegen-einander-messen der Seelenthätigkeiten*).}

\textsuperscript{‘passive Modifizierung der Seele.’ Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche* vol. 1, 173.}


\textsuperscript{‘So entsteht die Dreiteilung in Gefühl (d.h. Modifikabilität und Bewusstsein davon!), Verstand und Willen.’ Dessoir, *Geschichte* 344. According to Abicht, *Psychologische Anthropologie* 61, these are the heart (power of feeling), the mind (power of representation) and the temper (power of will). A detailed justification of the genuine power of feeling (*Gefühlsvermögen*) can be found in Richter, *Ueber das Gefühlvermögen* 14. In opposition to Krug, who considers a feeling to be a creation (*neugeschaffen*) and non-existent, Richter writes: ‘To want to turn our pleasant and unpleasant feelings into representations, means to not explore their nature, but to distort it.’ (Die ‘angenehmen und unangenehmen Gefühle unser selbst zu Vorstellungen machen wollen, heißt ihre Natur nicht ergründen, sondern verkehren.’) Cf. the section on Kant (‘Übergang zum Gefühl’) in Newmark C., *Passion, Affekt, Gefühl. Philosophische Theorien der Emotionen zwischen Aristoteles und Kant* (Hamburg: 2008) 204–223.}

\textsuperscript{‘drey Haupt-Vermögen’. Weber H.B. von, *Vom Selbstgefühle und Mitgefühle, ein Beytrag zur pragmatischen Anthropologie* (Heidelberg: 1807) 1.}

\textsuperscript{‘drei Hauptformen des psychischen Lebens’. Nahlosky J.W., *Das Gefühlssleben. Dargestellt aus praktischen Gesichtspunkten* (Leipzig: 1862) 41.}

\textsuperscript{Ulich D., *Das Gefühl. Eine Einführung in die Emotionspsychologie* (Weinheim: 31995) 17: ‘Der dreigeteilte Mensch.’}
“feeling”, by setting it off terminologically from sensation (Empfindung) and declaring that ‘that which must always remain merely subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object [we shall call] by the ordinary term “feeling”’.80

So emotions are now intense feelings that develop out of the subjective self-awareness of what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, and out of the subsequent formation of the soul (Bildung der Seele). They are no longer explained as obscure representations and as concatenations of representation and motion; also, as particularly strong feelings, they are no longer part of the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen).81 Kant admits, in his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, first part, book II, about “The feeling of pleasure and displeasure”, that the treatment of emotions (affects) ‘as feelings of pleasure and displeasure that transgress the bounds of the human being’s inner freedom’,82 should be dealt with in the same section. Similarly, in The Metaphysics of Moral: ‘Affects and passion are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to feelings.’83 By contrast, according to Kant, passions are


81 The proposition of emotion as the gradual intensity of a feeling is also discussed by Maaß and Carus. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff 109ff. It is Herbart who first dismisses the intensity-based distinction between feeling and emotion (Affekt) and divides them according to principles. Cf. Herbart J.F., Psychologie als Wissenschaft vol. II (Amsterdam: 1968, reprint of the 1850 edition) 103. So does Franz X. Biunde, arguing that both sexual desire and physical pain are intense feelings without being counted as emotions. Ergo emotion (Affekt) must be defined in some way other than merely as an intense feeling. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff 121. This distinction, however, will not prevail: emotion will continue to be regarded as a particularly intense feeling, as in Rehmke, Wundt, Ziegler etc. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff passim.


inclinations. This distinction is broadly commented on by Professor Johann Christoph Hoffbauer from Halle: ‘Emotion (Affekt) is always a condition of the faculty of feeling; […] Passion is always some desire striving for satisfaction. Its expressions are often linked to emotions. However, this does not mean that emotion is a passion.’

Kant exemplifies this distinction of emotion and passion by comparing anger (Zorn) and hatred. The angry emotion implies a momentary and quickly passing ‘weakness in the use of one’s understanding.’ Emotion is defined as ‘surprise through sensation’ and thereby as a gradually rising intensity of feeling ‘which makes reflection impossible.’ By contrast, passion corrupts reason while leaving the understanding untouched, it ‘permits reflection.’ This is why passion, which turns into an inclination, is closer to vice than the passing storm of emotion (Sturm des Affekts). And this is also the starting point for the reassessment of anger (in medical terms as well), which gets promoted from a mainly dangerous illness to a mainly healing energy, while, by contrast,
suppressed anger, hatred and, later, resentment, are described as a mental or physical cancerous damage.91

At the same time, we have seen how even the element of revenge associated with anger has lost its impact during the process of transcoding emotion. In his *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View*—and this is essential for any further discussion on emotions—Immanuel Kant links the separation of anger and revenge to the distinction of the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire (a novel concept around 1700). Anger and revenge, which up to this date had always been considered united as one emotion (Affekt) (representation plus desire), are now split into feeling/emotion (anger) on one hand, and desire/passion (revenge) on the other. The new limit between the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire runs right through the middle of the old emotion of anger. The distinction, in principle, of emotion and passion which Kant draws by applying the criterion of duration, quickly became generally adopted. Accordingly, “emotion” describes a strong feeling that erupts suddenly and lasts only moments, while “passion” denotes an inclination that takes root. A distinction that, to this day, sounds plausible especially in regard to the terminology used in the field of anger: ‘What the affect of anger does not accomplish quickly it does not at all; and it forgets easily. But the passion of hatred takes its time, in order to root itself deeply and think about its opponent.’92 At the same time, this distinction by the criterion of duration is based on the assignation of emotion/feeling to the biological sphere, and of passion to the social sphere.93 Emotions result from feelings of pleasure and displeasure, from ‘the effect that the sensation produces on our state of mind’94 and in view of obstructions and stimulations to the ‘vital force’ (Lebenskraft):95 ‘Enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life.’96

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95 Kant, *Anthropology* 126 (§ 60).

96 Ibidem. ‘Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung; Schmerz das einer Hindernis des Lebens.’ Kant, *Anthropologie* 167 (§ 60). This thesis will be further differentiated and
Anger is the condition caused by the obstruction of one’s life force and provides a sudden mobilisation of energy in order to override the obstruction. Anger is described as a strong feeling resp. emotion and as such affects man’s feeling of self as well as his attitude toward life. This is why anger can be considered separately from the social dimension of honour and revenge. All social requirements for anger, which had, for centuries, upheld it as the privileged emotion of a sovereign, linking it to the condition of having the necessary force available for taking revenge, are now obsolete, as anger transforms into a function of life itself. In consequence, anger grows close to a pre-cultural, self-defensive reaction of life, so that the natural right to self-defense as the spontaneous and immediate energy for clearing life’s obstructions may be recoded biologically.

By contrast, according to Kant, the passion of a lust for revenge originates in the most powerful of the natural passions, i.e. in the inclination toward freedom that can be found in the natural or primitive man as much as in a child. Man perceives the limitation of freedom as an injustice—which makes for the social dimension of passion. Even the newborn ‘seems to enter the world with loud cries […]', simply because it regards the inability to make use of its limbs as constraint, and cannot but ‘take an obstacle to it as an affront’. Kant even deduces that it is ‘as if a certain concept of justice (which relates to external freedom) develops along with their animality, and is not something to be learned gradually.’ So for Kant the inclination toward freedom (and love of self) goes along with an innate desire for justice that will turn into desire for revenge whenever freedom is limited. Kant argues that in the event of the emotion of anger, the slight (as an obstruction to life) is aimed only at the inner life, toward one’s own sense of self and the elimination of the obstruction. However, if anger does not erupt, and the desire for justice turns, instead,
into hatred of the unjust, then passion gains a genuinely social dimension, insofar as the postponed anger bears a ‘passion of retribution’ (‘Leidenschaft der Wiedervergeltung’) that will socially attribute the evil as slight and injustice. As we can see in the example of the crying newborns, we apparently cannot simply perceive an evil and want to get rid of it without at the same time interpreting it as a slight and an injustice.

In order to evaluate the consequences which transcoding emotion into feeling has on the modelling of anger and rage, we need to further analyse the concept of “feeling”. Feeling, as distinguished from representation and desire, always implies a sense of self (Selbstgefühl) insofar as it not only “observes” its own observations, but gives a ‘felt’ feedback on its own abilities of observation. When there is feeling, there will always be feedback, as well as a retroactive effect on one’s faculties resp. one’s ‘inner realities’. Along the same lines, Abicht says that ‘according to this, all our feelings are a sense of self.’ Tetens defines the ‘sense of self’ as ‘a sense of any kind of inner conditions and changes, as seen both for themselves and in the way they exist within us.’ Apparently, the concept of the sense of self implies a self-referentiation that is its own object. Tetens clearly states this:

We also feel the subjectivistic circumstances and relations of objects and changes on our current condition; or rather, we perceive the things along with their effects and impressions within us, as they originate them inside us according to their relation toward us.


101 Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 187.

102 ‘Demnach sind alle unsere Gefühle Selbstgefühle.’ Abicht, Psychologische Anthropologie 68. See also Weber, Vom Selbstgefühle und Mitgefühle 9.


104 ‘Wir fühlen auch die subjektivistischen Verhältnisse und Beziehungen der Gegenstände und der Veränderungen auf unseren jetzigen Zustand, oder eigentlich, wir empfinden die Dinge mit ihren Wirkungen und Eindrücken in uns, die sie in Gemäßigkeit ihrer Beziehungen auf uns hervorbringen.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 190 (emphasis added).
Feeling, as the entity of self-reference which acts neither through representation nor will\textsuperscript{105} does not register inner operations of understanding, but only relations to the exterior and the self. It communicates other-reference by way of self-reference: ‘Therefore, we cannot think of an object that would be felt immediately and in itself, other than of “anybody’s self-acquirable perfections of mental faculties” stated in the precept\textsuperscript{106} It is feeling, in the form of pleasure or displeasure, which communicates to the subject the state of her powers within the energetic polarity of lightness and resistance. ‘When we feel our easy and animated occupations, we have a pleasurable feeling.’\textsuperscript{107} At the core of feeling stands ‘the sense of self that registers the exercising or obstructing of my powers’.\textsuperscript{108} Going beyond the intuitively imagined perfection of representation, Schmid also describes the pleasurable feeling as a positive feedback effect in regard to the internal system's mental processes:

If the objects (and the organs, as modifying objects) of our faculty of representation are disposed in such a way and stand in such a relation to ourselves that they offer to its sensibility (Empfänglichkeit) such material, and as much material, as they do to the purpose (Zwecke) of the advancing effectiveness (Würcksamkeit) of its active faculty, and as is appropriate to this: thus arises the feeling of pleasure.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{106} ‘Folglich ist kein Objekt denkbar, welches unmittelbar und an sich fühlbar wäre, als die im Grundsätze genannten “selbsterwerblichen Vollkommenheiten der Seelenkräfte eines Jeden”.’ Abicht, Psychologische Anthropologie 67 (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{107} ‘Wenn wir unsere leichten und muntern Beschäftigungen fühlen, so haben wir ein angenehmes Gefühl.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 183.

\textsuperscript{108} ‘das Selbstgefühl von der Uebung oder Einschränkung meiner Kräfte’. Hungar Karl Ferdinand, “Gedanken über die Natur der Empfindung—des Vergnügens und Missvergnügens”, in Karl Adolf Caesar, Denkwürdigkeiten aus der philosophischen Welt, vol. 1 (Leipzig, Johann Gottfried Müller: 1785) 268–318, 284. This polarity of effort and ease as criterion for pleasure and displeasure is frequently found even throughout the nineteenth century, see e.g. Nahlowsky, Gefühlsleben 87f.

\textsuperscript{109} ‘Wenn die Gegenstände (und Organe als modificirende Gegenstände) unsres Vorstellungsvermögens so beschaffen sind und in einem solchen Verhältnisse zu uns stehen, daß sie der Empfänglichkeit desselben einen solchen und so vielen Stoff darbieten als dem Zwecke der fortschreitenden Würcksamkeit seines thätigen Vermögens an denselben angemessen ist: so entsteht das Gefühl der Lust.’ Schmid, Empirische Psychologie 273.
The relation to the world as well as the object relations of pleasure are opaqued by self-reference. Says Weber: ‘Here we have the fundamental law of all pleasures and displeasures [...].’ Pleasure does not originate from knowledge (Erkenntnis) (from the intuition of perfection), it arises whenever one’s power is able to ‘express itself’, i.e., when one feels that things are advancing. This feeling of advancement is not meant in absolute terms, but rather as advancement in relation to the experience of the prior moment. Richter even identifies this feeling of empowerment with ‘happiness’ (Glückseligkeit), and happiness, in turn, with ‘life’. Whatever blocks or restrains, by contrast, the feeling of one’s ‘progressing effectiveness’ (fortschreitende(n) Würcksamkeit), be it for internal or external reasons, injures the sense of self and causes displeasure. The complete internalization of the injury to one’s feeling of personal power opens a new and ample space for rage as a feeling of displeasure which is totally different from the space occupied by anger as of old Zorn (and its mixture of pain and pleasure), with both “insult” as its social event and its desire for revenge.

As the blockades from the outside world are perceived as insults to one’s sense of self, new forms of rage are created, in which that what had been the element of injury in the old narrative of anger is quasi taken within. The element of revenge is internalized as well, thereby rid of its function, and once internalized may be joined to self-destruction. Whereas anger leads us to want to take revenge on someone, rage causes us to be driven out of our skin, to want to get past ourselves or—even—to destroy ourselves.

The (avant la lettre) given, fundamentally narcissistic grounding of the human soul in feeling, is what first allows man, with his psyche and “emotional life”, to be constituted as the object of an independent empirical science. If, ‘in the stream of time and in the change of sensation connected with it’, feelings

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112 ‘Whether a condition or a series of conditions is to be regarded as pleasurable or disagreeable can only be judged, therefore, by relating the actual condition to the preceding conditions.’ Schmid, *Empirische Psychologie* 274. ‘Ob ein Zustand oder eine Reihe von Zuständen angenehm oder unangenehm sey, kann also nur aus dem Verhältniss des gegenwärtigen zu den vorhergehenden Zuständen beurtheilt werden.’


of pleasure and displeasure permanently scan the feedback and modification of one’s system status, and if each feeling represents, in turn, the condition for the subsequent act of the soul, which, again, will be felt etc., then the psychological experience of man is individualized and subjected to time in a way that can only be recovered empirically.116

The leading metaphors to this end will be metaphors of live force and of creative force as well as the hypothesis of the “metabolism” between system and environment, all of which are paradigmatic for human thought by the end of the eighteenth century, biologically as well as aesthetically. The psychological and the biological man are of the same provenance. Together with the feeling, a feedback system is introduced into the human being, which modifies and communicates the conditions of its own powers, and in the end refers to the life force energy that underlies all powers of the soul, as well as the medical categories of health and sickness which accompany it. ‘Enjoyment’, as, once again, Kant states, ‘is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life. But (animal) life, as physicians also have already noted, is a continuous play of the antagonism of both.’117

Not only when it comes to defining feeling as such, but also in his analysis of single emotional feelings (Affektgefühle) does Kant refer to the role played by feelings in relation to the obstruction and ‘promotion of the vital force’.118 In analogy to the theory of illness by the Scottish physician John Brown, Kant divides the emotions (which now belong to the faculty of feeling and no longer to the faculty of desire) into sthenic and asthenic, i.e. into such which either excite or relax the vital force.119 Time and time again, Kant approaches the emotions (Affekte) not only in regard to ethical, but also to medical questions,120 i.e. in regard to the way in which single emotions influence the life force resp. in how far they might be effective as ‘a provision of nature for health’.121 Christian

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117 Kant, Anthropology 126 (§60). ‘Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung; Schmerz das eines Hindernisses des Lebens. Leben aber (des Tiers) ist, wie auch schon die Ärzte angemerkt haben, ein kontinuierliches Spiel des Antagonismus von beiden.’ Kant, Anthropologie 167 (§ 60).
118 Kant, Anthropology 126 (§60). ‘Beförderung der Lebenskraft’, Kant, Anthropologie 167 (§ 60).
119 Kant, Anthropology 154 (§ 76).
121 Ibidem 162 (§79).‘Vorsorge der Natur für die Gesundheit’, Kant, Anthropologie 206 (§ 79). Parting from Kant’s distinction between anger (emotion) and hatred (passion) it now becomes common (and remains so to this day), to view anger which erupts as beneficial for health, whereas repressed vexation (Ärger) or deeply rooted hatred is regarded as
Erhard Schmid, who continues to develop the Kantian terminology, also works on his formulation of a ‘natural law of the feeling of pleasure’\textsuperscript{122} using terms like ‘matter’, ‘stimulus’, ‘power’ and ‘learning ability’. Just as the organism, since Blumenbach described within the framework of epigenesis, uses its own formative power (\textit{Bildungskraft}) to process the stimulus of all matter offered by the outside world, creating itself in a continuous autopoiesis,\textsuperscript{123} so does Schmid relate this exact process to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The first concern is an adequate ratio between matter and power: The outside world is the matter which functions as a stimulus (or, as Beneke will later write, as ‘educational momentum’)\textsuperscript{124} on the power or activity of the organism which now starts to process or to form the matter. ‘The moment of progressing, of forming, is the moment of pleasure. The moment of being obstructed, of striving in vain to form, is the moment of displeasure.’\textsuperscript{125} While, at first, the concept of formation (\textit{Bildung}) refers only to the processing and forming of the matter, the autopoietic moment of self-creation resp. the moment of feedback appears a little further into the text. The story of the respective events occurring between power and matter leads to consequences regarding the intensity of the imagination and the intensity of pleasure. Both their degrees of inten-


\textsuperscript{123} Cf. Blumenbach Johann Friedrich, \textit{Über den Bildungstrieb} (Göttingen, Johann Christian Dieterich: 1791, \textsuperscript{1789}). Tetens, \textit{Philosophische Versuche} vol. 2, 529, writes: ‘Just as human nature is never alone, and nowhere detached of the influence of external things, but always acting, where it does act, in conjunction with others: such it is with the inner principle of formation in its seed.’—‘Wie überhaupt die Natur des Menschen nirgends allein ist, und nirgends abgesondert von dem Einfluß äußerer Dinge, sondern nur immer in der Verbindung mit andern das wirkt, was sie wirkt: so verhält es sich auch mit dem innern Princip der Bildung in dem Keim.’ Hillebrand J., \textit{Die Anthropologie als Wissenschaft. Erster Teil oder Allgemeine Naturlehre des Menschen} (Mainz: 1822) 211f., describes human life in analogy to a plant as a ‘self-acting creating, a reproducing, a nourishing and an internally conditioned interacting with the outside world or the external potencies of life’ (‘selbstthätiges Gestalten, ein Fortpflanzen, ein Ernähren und ein innerlich bedingtes Verkehren mit der Außenwelt oder den äußeren Potenzen des Lebens’, emphasis added).


sity depend on the organism’s *history*: ‘The stronger the drive of imagination is, generally, and the more it has been stimulated: that much stronger will be the *pleasure* if it can find satisfaction in the matter.’\(^{126}\) And the power of the imagination, too, depends on the *previous* occurrence of stimulus and processing: It is ‘strong due to practice per se—or weak due to lack of any practice.’\(^{127}\) By way of a training effect, today’s displeasure can help prepare tomorrow’s pleasure. Thereby, in the end, the natural law of feeling leads us back to the *individual* history of the organism.

For feeling itself, as the continuous and involuntary self-reference of the system, depends on its own system status with its own history of formation, which is why theories on feeling are able to expand at length on why one and the same object does not always elicit the same feeling. ‘A feeling is not the objective trait of an object, but something entirely subjective.’\(^{128}\) The focus lies always on the fact that the thought or representation which produces a feeling has a specifically variable relation to other thoughts and representations:

> That same thought, which a deep thinker, whose every thought displays the same level of stress, forms within himself without a trace of feeling, would announce itself to a less practiced thinker with a feeling of the sublime, should he succeed in recreating that thought in all of its truth.\(^{129}\)

To each new feeling, the system brings along itself and its specific structure, which it has itself constituted through its feelings. Beneke calls this ‘the dispositions or inner traces which the feelings leave behind’\(^{130}\) or else the ‘basic

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126 ‘Je stärker der Trieb der Vorstellungskraft überhaupt, und je mehr er jedesmahl gereizt worden ist: um so stärker ist die Lust, wenn er in dem Stoff seine Befriedigung findet.’ Schmid, *Empirische Psychologie* 283f. (emphasis added).


formations’ (‘Grundbildungen’)\textsuperscript{131} resp. the ‘remaining connections’, which ‘can offer most influential moments for the mental development.’\textsuperscript{132}

This fundamental thought of the historicity of mental formation, in which the dispositions formed become themselves the subject of further development of the soul, is formulated by Herbart to the effect that the history of the system affects the respective and always present self-observation: ‘Involuntarily, throughout their lives, everybody is their own spectator and this is how they acquire their own life story. They also bring this story, and the knowledge of their person taken from it, along to any self-observance.’\textsuperscript{133} This explicitly addresses the crucial aspect that feelings and emotions are now founded in personal history (\textit{Lebensgeschichte}).\textsuperscript{134} The result of the discourse that laid bare the feeling and associated emotion to it, is that rage resp. anger is now a \textit{feeling} and, as such, rooted in each individually structured inner mental world. From now on, in order to understand the reason for an outbreak of rage, as well as against what or whom it erupts, one has to tell the whole inner story (and the external personal history), one must know the ‘system’ and its conditions in order to understand how and why rage originated. One does not sympathise easily with the angry person, for: ‘We do not know the reference his imagination has made to his self-love; his temper and his relations and situations are not our own.’\textsuperscript{135} If rage arises out of the self-observance of the system and the injury to the sense of self, it is necessarily linked to internal, invisible and probably distant factors. Consequently, in order to understand the anger/the rage,

\textsuperscript{131} Beneke, \textit{Lehrbuch der Psychologie} 187: ‘The circumstances of feelings that arise from the basic formations will propagate themselves onto all complex formations which will be composed of the basic formations.’—‘Die in den Grundbildungen begründeten Gefühlsverhältnisse werden sich auf alle zusammengesetzten Bildungen fortpflanzen, in welche jene als Bestandtheile eingehen.’


\textsuperscript{133} ‘Unabsichtlich ist jeder sein eigener Zuschauer während seines ganzen Lebens, und eben dadurch gewinnt er seine eigene Lebensgeschichte. Auch bringt er diese Geschichte, und die aus ihr geschöpfte Kenntniss seiner Person, zu jeder Selbstbeobachtung mit.’ Herbart, \textit{Psychologie als Wissenschaft} 18f.

\textsuperscript{134} For this cf. the paper by Fink-Eitel H., “Affekte. Versuch einer philosophischen Bestandsaufnahme”, \textit{Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung} 40 (1986) 520–542. Although the details of the historic reconstruction in this paper are in part incorrect, it gives a clear account of the relevance of emotions for any subject theory and the theory of verbal communication. On the narrative scheme of the life-story cf. the section on Schiller’s \textit{Verbrecher aus Infamie} in chapter VI in Lehmann, \textit{Im Abgrund der Wut} 192–223.

\textsuperscript{135} ‘Wir kennen bey diesem die Beziehung nicht, die seine Einbildungskraft auf seine Selbstliebe gemacht hat, sein Temperament und seine Verhältnisse und Lagen sind nicht die unsrigen.’ Lossius, Art. “Zorn” 653–655, here 655.
one must—in accordance with the level of general hermeneutics formulated around the same time—focus all efforts both on the smallest detail and the entire context.\footnote{\textit{Cf. Lehmann J.F., “Verstehen des Zorns. Zur Hermeneutik Schleiermachers und der Kriminalpsychologie um 1800” in Heinen S. – Nehr H. (eds.), Krisen des Verstehens (Würzburg: 2004) 93–110.}} This leads to consequences in the depiction and narrative of rage and anger, for now, the ‘material of the narrative can be separated entirely from the conceptual analysis [of the emotion, J.L.].’\footnote{‘[Das] narrative Material kann ganz von der begrifflichen Analyse [des Affekts, J.L.] getrennt werden.’ Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} 392.} Once more I cite Rüdiger Campe:

While the narrative schemes of the old doctrine of affections (who hates whom and in which regard?) always gave a definition of single emotions, we now have case reports in which is displayed the mechanism of passion, or reports taken from introspection, which place before our eyes the change of times as a subjective experience.\footnote{‘Waren die Erzählschemata der alten Affektenlehre (wer haßt wen in Hinsicht worauf?) immer auch schon die Definition des einzelnen Affekts, gibt es jetzt Fallberichte, an denen sich das Wirken der Leidenschaft zeigt, oder aus der Introspektion gewonnene Berichte, die den Wechsel der Zeit als subjektives Erleben vor Augen stellen.’ Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} 392.}

For the depiction of feelings of rage and anger, this separation of the narrative scheme (of the old emotion) on the one hand and the case report on the other hand implies that the occasion for, resp. the cause and eruption of rage, can no longer per se be ascribed to each other by way of the plot of the definition of emotion, but may diverge in each new case in new ways. From now on, one can recount rage whose “reason” or “unreason” permeates the whole text resp. the textuality of the emotional life resp. the personal history of feeling.\footnote{In fact, Nahlowsky, \textit{Gefühlsleben} later describes the emotional life as ‘the individually shaped inner world’ (‘die individuell gestaltete Innenwelt’) (p. 5) and this ‘inner world’ as a ‘texture of combinations of representations’ (‘Textur von Vorstellungsverbindungen’) (p. 6).}

Selected Bibliography


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